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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FORMEN CORPORATION, et al., 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
vs. 
MEL PARKS, et al. , 
Defendants-
Respondents . 
Case No. 870510-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PETITION 
Pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, defendants-respondents hereby petition this Court for a 
rehearing of this case, or in the alternative for the correction 
of a clerical error. 
The ground for this petition is that the Court's opinion 
indicates that the only plaintiff is Formen Corporation, and 
awards attorney fees and double costs in favor of respondents 
and against Formen, whereas the appeal was prosecuted by two 
individual parties in addition to Formen. 
9 
The undersigned counsel hereby certifies that this petition 
is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
A copy of the Court's opinion is attached as Appendix "A". 
ARGUMENT 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND DOUBLE COSTS 
SHOULD BE IMPOSED AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS 
AS WELL AS THE CORPORATE PLAINTIFF. 
The initial complaint in this case was filed by Formen 
Corporation only. (R. 1-17•) (A copy of the first page of the 
initial complaint appears in Appendix "B" for the Court's 
reference.) An amended complaint was subsequently filed, 
listing as plaintiffs Formen Corporation, J. Fred Smith, and Don 
R. Skipworth. (R. 912-53.) (A copy of the first page of the 
amended complaint appears in Appendix "C" for the Court's 
reference.) The individual plaintiffs were directors and 
shareholders of Formen. (Tr. 51, 244.) The case proceeded to 
trial on the amended complaint. 
The Court's opinion in this matter uses the pleading 
heading from the initial complaint rather than that of the 
amended complaint. More critically, the Court's opinion states 
as follows: 
The judgment of the trial court is 
affirmed and the case is remanded for a 
determination of Parks' attorney fees on 
appeal which are ordered to be paid by 
Formen. Double costs are ordered against 
Formen pursuant to Rule 33(a). 
Formen Corp. v. Parks, No. 870510-CA (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 13, 
1988)(emphasis added). 
Respondents respectfully submit that the attorney fees and 
double costs should have been awarded against each of the 
plaintiffs, jointly and severally. Respondents assume that the 
reference to Formen only in the opinion is a clerical error, and 
2 
request that the opinion be corrected to reflect that each of 
the plaintiffs is liable for the attorney fees and double costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The petition for rehearing should be granted, and the 
opinion corrected to reflect that any judgment on remand for 
attorney fees and double costs may be entered against Formen 
Corporation, Don Skipworth, and J. Fred Smith, jointly and 
severally. 
DATED this 27th day of October, 1988. 
JACKSON HOWARD and £f 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Respondents 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 
27th day of October, 1988. 
Lowell V. Summerhays 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
4609 South State Street 
P.O. Box 1355 
Sandy, Utah 84091-1355 
3 
APPENDIX "A" 
Formen Corp. v. Parks, 
No. 870510-CA (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1988). 
Formen Corporation/ 
a Utah corporation. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooooo OCT 141988 
HOWARD. LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Mel Parks/ Parks Enterprises, Inc., 
a Idaho corporation/ Nasky Joint 
Venture, a partnership, Del Taylor, 
Nancy Taylor, his wife# Larry 
Anderson/ Hal Parks, Jerry Parks, 
Starla Parks, aka Starla Peterson, 
Don Charlesworth, Bryce Averill, 
Harry Keith Huffaker, Elza 
Huffaker, his wife, Thomas Gene 
Reid, Mary Reid, his wife, 
Wanda Hopper, and John Does I 
through X, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Before Judges Garff, Davidson and Billings. 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 870510-CA 
F I L E D 
;j4 31G33 
Meryl Kocrun 
Ctcr1.' d t'.-i3 Court 
UU-.S. Ccu* of Appeals 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Formen Corporation (Formen) is a Utah corporation whose 
stockholders and officers, during the time at issue# included 
J. Fred Smith (Smith) and Donald R. Skipworth (Skipworth)• 
Parks Enterprises, Inc. (Parks) is an Idaho corporation whose 
stockholders and officers were members of the Melvin R. Parks 
(Mel Parks) family. 
On May 1, 1978, Formen and Parks executed a joint venture 
agreement for the purpose of developing and selling a 
recreational tract of land in Sanpete County, Utah, to be known 
as Elk Ridge Ranches (Elk Ridge). The agreement required Parks 
to ezpend $180,000.00 to acquire the land to be developed. 
Formen was required to accept full liability and responsibility 
for the development of Elk Ridge including obtaining 
governmental approvals, constructing roads, promoting the 
venture, and sales. The parties acknowledged that water was 
essential to the agreement so Formen agreed to purchase the 
water and provide water rights to the parcels as they were 
sold. In the event Formen defaulted under the terms of the 
agreement or the agreement terminated short of its time, Parks 
had the right to assume Formen's position in the water purchase 
contract. The agreement also provided for the return of title 
to Parks of all unsold property when the joint venture 
terminated. At that time, Parks had the right to acquire the 
water rights pertaining to the parcels at a price equal to 
Formen's cost. The agreement was signed by Smith as president 
of Formen and M. Hal Parks, Mel Parks' son, as president of 
Parks. 
Later, the parties discussed another development in the 
same area and agreed that Formen and Parks would employ funds 
from Elk Ridge to purchase the property. The parties proceeded 
with this new venture on the basis that the expenses and 
profits would be shared equally by the parties. This 
development was known as Hideaway Valley. 
As a result of a disagreement in the spring of 1981, a 
memorandum of partnership dissolution agreement was executed. 
The dissolution agreement cited the joint venture agreement 
concerning Elk Ridge and referred to Hideaway Valley as another 
joint venture which Formen desired to establish. The parties 
mutually agreed that the joint ventures would be terminated as 
of December 31, 1980. Additionally, the assets and liabilities 
would be divided equally. The agreement contained a confusing 
provision for attorney fees if a party sought enforcement with 
an attorney or brought suit for enforcement. After the 
dissolution agreement was executed, Formen continued alone with 
the development of Hideaway Valley. Parks withdrew from that 
development with the exception of building a family complex on 
land situated in Hideaway Valley. 
A Hideaway Valley Property Owners Association (HVPOA) was 
formed with three officers of Formen initially serving as 
trustees. During early summer 1982, the purchasers of property 
in Hideaway Valley received $65,00 assessments from the HVPOA 
which were mailed in Formen envelopes. On or about August 15, 
1982, several Hideaway Valley property owners met at the Parks 
complex to discuss the assessment. Also in attendance was 
Skipworth, a HVPOA trustee, who informed those present that the 
trustees alone would decide how the money was to be spent. 
Skipworth testified at trial that the trustees contemplated 
using the assessment for road maintenance and snow removal. 
During October 1982, another meeting took place in which five 
individuals were elected trustees including Smith and Mel Parks. 
The new trustees specifically discussed purchasing equipment 
for snow removal operations, but could not agree on what course 
of action to take* At a trustee's meeting of January 10, 1983, 
Mel Parks' position as a trustee was terminated by other 
trustees. Subsequently, one trustee and a member of the HVPOA 
wrote to Hideaway Valley property owners to inform them Mel 
Parks had been "released" from his position as a trustee and 
that a meeting of the HVPOA would be held in Provo on January 
27, 1983, to discuss the problems facing the association and to 
elect new trustees. On or about January 18, 1983, Formen 
retained a business consultant to investigate and "evaluate the 
situation" in Hideaway Valley and inform them as to the "whole 
scenario." The consultant spoke with several property owners 
concerning his fictitious interest in purchasing two lots in 
Hideaway Valley. He was told of problems including how the 
HVPOA was utilizing assessment funds, availability of water, 
and property foreclosures. One owner stated there was a "gross 
overcharge" for snow removal. The owners told the consultant 
that zoning problems made it difficult to obtain a building 
permit, and that they were anticipating being sued by Formen. 
Another owner stated, "[Y]ou can't believe anything that they 
say." The consultant testified this referred to Smith. Two 
owners informed the consultant, "You don't want to buy a lot 
until you find out exactly what you're getting into." 
The very next day, January 19, 1983, Formen filed the 
complaint in this action. Formen sought and was granted a 
temporary restraining order which enjoined defendants from 
making any verbal or written statements which were defamatory 
or making contacts with others which would be detrimental to 
Formen. Subsequent to an order to show cause hearing, the 
trial court denied a motion for permanent injunction. 
An amended complaint was filed on July 7, 1983, adding 
Smith and Skipworth as plaintiffs and deleting Don Charlesworth 
as a defendant. This complaint alleged: (1) tortious 
interference against all defendants; (2) slander of Formen 
against all defendants; (3) slander of Skipworth against all 
defendants; (4) slander of Smith against all defendants; (5) 
negligence against Mel Parks; (6) antitrust violations against 
all defendants; (7) injunctive relief against all defendants; 
(8) foreclosure against Thomas Gene Reid and Mary Reid, his 
wife; (9) foreclosure against Bryce Averill and Mary Averill, 
his wife; and (10) foreclosure against Harry Keith Huffaker and 
Elza Huffaker, his wife. 
On October 28, 1983/ the defendants, with the exception 
of Larry Anderson, answered the amended complaint. In 
addition, those defendants counterclaimed for: (1) costs and 
attorney fees in defending the action; (2) general and 
compensatory damages resulting from the injury to defendants' 
reputation; (3) punitive damages; (4) costs for the 
counterclaim; (5) reformation of the partnership dissolution 
agreement to provide Parks with the water rights necessary for 
the properties they received under the dissolution agreement; 
(6) rescission of the contracts between Formen and the 
foreclosure defendants; and (7) refund of all monies paid by 
the foreclosure defendants to Formen. 
Both sides moved for summary judgment. By an order dated 
March 27/ 1984, the trial court granted partial summary 
judgment to defendants, dismissed certain defendants/ and 
dismissed plaintiffs' cause of action for injunctive relief. 
A bench trial on the remaining causes of action was held 
on August 27-31# 1984. At the close of plaintiffs' case, 
defendants moved for dismissal. The parties stipulated to a 
dismissal of plaintiffs' cause of action against Mel Parks for 
negligence. The trial court subsequently granted defendants' 
motion to dismiss as to the other causes of action and 
dismissed defendants' counterclaim for malicious prosecution. 
By an order dated October 30, 1984, the trial court stated 
Parks was entitled to a decree of reformation which ordered 
Formen to provide Parks water# without cost/ for those lots 
conveyed to Parks under the dissolution agreement. The court 
also found plaintiffs' case to be without merit and lacking in 
good faith. Therefore, attorney fees and costs were awarded to 
defendants pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1987). 
Plaintiffs appeal from: (1) evidentiary rulings of the 
trial court plaintiff claims were biased and prejudiced; (2) 
the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining causes of 
action pursuant to Utah R. Civ, P. 41(b); (3) reformation of 
the partnership dissolution agreement to provide Parks water; 
(4) granting of summary judgment to the foreclosure defendants; 
and (5) the award of attorney fees against plaintiffs. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This court/ in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199/ 202-03 
(Utah App. 1987)/ cited Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) and quoted Acton 
v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996/ 999 (Utah 1987) as it related to 
findings of fact. Rule 52(a) states findings of fact "shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses." In Utah/ the "clearly erroneous" 
standard requires "that if the findings . . . are against the 
clear weight of the evidence/ or if the appellate court otherwise 
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made/ the findings • . . will be set aside." State v. Wright, 
744 P.2d 315/ 317 (Utah App. 1987)(quoting State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191/ 193 (Utah 1987)). "To mount a successful attack on the 
trial court's findings of fact/ an appellant must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then 
demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable to 
the court below# the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings." Scharf v. BMG Corp,, 700 P.2d 1068# 1070 (Utah 
1985). Therefore/ this court must accept the trial court's 
findings unless we believe they are clearly erroneous/ they do 
not comport with Acton, or a party challenging the findings 
establishes there is insufficient evidence to support them. 
EVIDENTIARY RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
Formenfs brief presents several examples of evidentiary 
rulings supposedly reflecting bias and prejudice on the part of 
the trial court. Included is a specific instance in which 
testimony was not allowed. Also/ Formen asserts there were 
numerous occasions when Parks* objections were sustained while 
its own were overruled. Utah R. Evid. 403 states, "Although 
relevant/ evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury# or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." An appellate court "will 
not interfere with the trial court's ruling on evidentiary 
matters unless it clearly appears that the court so abused its 
discretion that there is a likelihood, that injustice resulted." 
State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 604 (Utah 1985). Any exhibition 
of bias or prejudice against or in favor of a party in 
evidentiary rulings by the trial court certainly would be a gross 
abuse of discretion. However, our reading of the transcript 
reveals no such bias or prejudice. This is an emotional case 
which contains testimony reflecting the parties' differing views 
of what transpired. It is natural that parties would be 
sensitive to any adverse evidentiary rulings. However/ no error 
is shown. The trial court appeared to make every effort to 
eliminite the irrelevant and to limit needlessly repetitive 
evidence. 
DISMISSAL OF FORMEN'S REMAINING CAUSES OF ACTION 
Formen claims the trial court erred in granting defendants' 
motion to dismiss its remaining causes of action. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 41(b) states in pertiner.t part: 
After the plaintiff, in an action tried by 
the court without a jury, has completed 
the presentation of his evidence the 
defendant, without waiving his right to 
offer evidence in the event the motion is 
not granted, may move for a dismissal on 
the ground that upon the facts and the law 
the plaintiff has shown no right to 
relief. The court as trier of the facts 
may then determine them and render 
judgment against the plaintiff or may 
decline to render any judgment until the 
close of all the evidence. If the court 
renders judgment on the merits against the 
plaintiff, the court shall make findings 
as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the 
court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided 
for in this rule, other than a dismissal 
for lack of jurisdiction or for improper 
venue or for lack of an indispensable 
party, operates as an adjudication upon 
the merits. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping 
Co., 711 P.2d 250 (Utah 1985), discussed this rule: 
The purpose of the rule is to permit the 
judge, as the fact finder, "to weigh the 
evidence, to draw inferences therefrom 
and, if it finds the evidence insufficient 
to make out a case for the plaintiff, to 
render a decision for the defendant on the 
merits. . . ." Rule 41(b) further 
provides that if the trial court grants a 
motion to dismiss at the close of the 
plaintiff's case, it must enter findings 
of fact "as provided in Rule 52(a)." It 
has often been stated that when reviewing 
factual findings of a court sitting 
without a jury, this Court defers to the 
trial court and will not overturn its 
findings if they are adequately supported 
by the evidence. . . . No such deference 
is given to conclusions of law that are 
reviewed for correctness. 
Id. at 252-53 (citations omitted). 
In this case, there are twenty-nine findings upon which the 
nine conclusions of law are based. The findings appear to 
carefully cover the causes of action dismissed by the court. 
a. Tortious Interference 
Leiah Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 
1982), discusses the elements of the tort of intentional 
interference with prospective economic relations. The court 
wrote: 
[I]n order to recover damages, the 
plaintiff must prove (1) that the 
defendant intentionally interfered with 
the plaintiffs existing or potential 
economic relations, (2) for an improper 
purpose or by improper means, (3) causing 
injury to the plaintiff. Privilege is an 
affirmative defense . . . which does not 
become an issue unless "the acts charged 
would be tortious on the part of an 
unprivileged defendant.-
Id. at 304 (citations omitted). The evidence fails to show the 
elements described above. Rather, it shows parties concerned 
with a troubling situation and pursuing their own business 
activities. The findings are supported by the evidence and 
will not be disturbed. 
b. Defamation 
The basic elements of defamation are listed in Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 558 (1977) as: 
(a) a false and defamatory statement 
concerning another; 
(b) an unprivileged publication to a 
third party; 
(c) fault amounting at least to 
negligence on the part of the 
publisher; and 
(d) either actionability of the statement 
irrespective of special harm or the 
existence of special harm caused by 
the publication. 
Examination of the findings relative to this issue 
indicates the trial court found no credible or believable 
evidence that any defendant made a defamatory statement/ that 
any of the statements they did make were false, or that 
plaintiff or an officer thereof suffered any damages because of 
an action of defendants. A review of the trial record supports 
the findings. 
c. Antitrust Violations 
Formen1s brief claims defendants have violated the Utah 
Antitrust Act "by restraining trade" and cites Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-914 (1988). Because that section is a criminal 
statute, Formen seeks a remedy under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-919(1) (1988). Section 76-10-914 states: 
(1) Every contract/ combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise/ or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade or 
commerce is declared to be illegal. 
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person 
to monopolize/ or attempt to 
monopolize/ or combine or conspire 
with any other person or persons to 
monopolize/ any part of trade or 
commerce. 
The findings specifically negate any conspiracy between or 
among defendants. No believable or credible evidence exists 
which shows defendants violated any antitrust laws. While the 
finding relative to' antitrust laws is more of a conclusion of 
law, Formen has failed to present even minimally sufficient 
evidence to support the claim. 
AGREEMENT REFORMATION 
Formen claims the trial court erred in reforming the 
memorandum of partnership dissolution agreement to provide 
water for the lots conveyed to defendants without cost. Case 
law on this issue is presented in Hottinoer v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 
1271 (Utah 1984)/ as: 
Reformation of a deed is a proceeding in 
equity and is appropriate where the terms 
of the written instrument are mistaken in 
that they do not show the true intent of 
the agreement between the parties. There 
are two grounds for reformation of such an 
agreement: mutual mistake of the parties 
and ignorance or mistake by one party, 
coupled with fraud by the other party. 
Id. at 1273 (footnotes omitted). However, reformation "is not 
available to rewrite a contract to include terms never 
contemplated by the parties." Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 
P.2d 549, 552 (Utah 1984). 
Findings of fact 14 through 19 discuss the intent of the 
parties concerning the land and the water and find that there 
was mutual mistake in not discussing the intent in the 
dissolution agreement. The trial court was correct. A reading 
of the joint venture agreement clearly shows Parks was required 
to purchase the property and Formen was responsible to acquire 
the water "essential to the intent" of the agreement. 
Additionally, Formen agreed to provide water rights to land 
parcels as they were sold. If, for some reason, Formen 
defaulted or the venture was not completed, then Parks had the 
right to assume Formen*s position in the purchase contract for 
the water. 
The joint venture agreement's section concerning 
termination required all unsold parcels to be distributed to 
Parks who then had a right to purchase the water rights 
pertaining thereto. However, the dissolution agreement 
requires the parties to divide the assets and liabilities of 
the joint venture agreement. In so doing, it provided that 
Formen would receive an equal amount of the property. Formen 
already had the water rights pertaining to the property it 
received under the dissolution agreement. To divide everything 
else, but then to require Parks to purchase water rights from 
Formen for the Parks parcels flies in the face of common sense. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS HUFFAKER 
Formen claims the trial court erred in entering summary 
judgment in favor of Harry and Elza Huffaker for recovery of 
funds paid to Formen for purchase of a land parcel. Formen 
argues that there were genuine issues of material fact, that 
Huffaker's claim was barred by the appropriate statute of 
limitation, and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. 
When Formen1s claims concerning issues of fact are compared 
to the evidence available to the trial court, we believe that 
the court below acted correctly. The argument on appeal 
concerning the trial court's lack of jurisdiction to g ant 
summary judgment is not developed in the brief sufficiently to 
follow. It appears to us that Formen is questioning whether 
this state's Sixth Judicial District Court is a "state court." 
We will not entertain this question. Nothing was raised below 
to show this claimed issue. Any argument not presented to the 
trial court will not be heard for the first time on appeal. 
Bancrerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983). 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1987) allows the trial court to 
award attorney fees "if the court determines that the action or 
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith."1 The case of Cadv v. Johnson, 671 
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983), states "without merit" means the 
case is "of little weight or importance having no basis in law 
or fact." To establish a lack of "good faith," the party 
requesting attorney fees must show that one or more of the 
following factors is missing: 
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of 
the activities in question; (2) no intent 
to take unconscionable advantage of 
others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge 
of the fact that the activities in 
question will, [sic] hinder, delay or 
defraud others. 
Id. (quoting Tacoma Assoc, of Credit Men v. Lester, 72 Wash.2d 
453, 458, 433 P.2d 901, 904 (1967)). The findings of fact 
carefully cover the issue. We agree that Formen1s case falls 
within the definition of without merit especially since it has 
all the appearances of being a manufactured preemptive legal 
strike. The lower court also found the case to lack good 
faith. We agree. As the findings state, the case was brought 
to "hinder and delay defendants," "to prevent the defendants 
from enjoying the use of their property," and to harass and 
frighten them. The evidence fully supports the findings and 
conclusion. 
1. The attorney fee provision in the dissolution agreement 
would ordinarily dictate the award of fees. In this case, 
however, the provision is inapplicable since it would award 
attorney fees to the party first filing an action without regard 
to fault or liability. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Parks requests attorney fees on appeal. This issue is guided 
by R. Utah Ct. App. 33(a) which states, "If the court determines 
that a motion made or an appeal taken under these rules is either 
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages and single or 
double costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to the 
prevailing party." This court's opinion in O'Brien v. Rush, 744 
P.2d 306 (Utah App.'1987), clarifies the rule. A frivolous appeal 
is one "having no reasonable legal or factual basis as defined in 
Rule [Utah Ct. App.] 40(a)" and an "appeal brought for delay is 
one marked by dilatory conduct or conduct designed to mislead the 
court and which benefits only the appellant." Icl. at 310. 
We find no reasonable legal or factual basis for the appeal. 
As an example showing a lack of legal or factual basis, Formen*s 
appellate brief contains the argument that the trial court erred 
in dismissing its cause of action for negligence against Mel 
Parks. However, the trial transcript reveals Formen stipulated to 
dismissal of the cause at trial. Such a course of conduct falls 
within the definition of frivolous. 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the case is 
remanded for a determination of Parks1 attorney fees on appeal 
which are ordered to be paid by Formen. Double costs are ordered 
against Formen pursuant to Rule 33(a). 
This opinion is not regarded as adding anything significant to 
existing law and hence is not to be published in the Utah or 
Pacific Reporters. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FORMEN CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
MEL PARKS, PARKS ENTERPRISE, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, 
NASKY JOINT VENTURE, a 
partnership, DEL TAYLOR, 
NANCY TAYLOR, his wife, 
LARRY ANDERSON, HAL PARKS, 
JERRY PARKS, STARLA PETERSEN 
a/k/a STARLA PARKS, DON • 
CHARLESWORTH, BRYCE AVERILL, 
HARRY KEITH HUFFAKER, ELZA 
HUFFAKER, his wife, THOMAS 
GENE REID, MARY REID, his 
wife, WANDA HOPPER and 
JOHN DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
VERIFIED 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. f.T7? 
The Plaintiff Formen Corporation by and through counsel 
Lowell V. Summerhays and Edward T. Wells of the firm of Summerhays, 
Runyan & McLella: d hereby complains of the Defendants and alleges 
follows: 
APPENDIX "C 
First page of Amended Verified Complaint 
Lowell V. Summerhays 
Edward T. Wells 
SUMMERHAYS, RUNYAN & McLELLAND 
420 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-5200 
Defendants for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FORMEN CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, DON SKIPWORTH, and 
FRED SMITH, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MEL PARKS, PARKS ENTERPRISE, INC., 
an Idaho corporation, NASKY JOINT 
VENTURE, a partnership, DEL TAYLOR, 
NANCY TAYLOR, his wife, LARRY ANDERSON 
HAL PARKS, JERRY PARKS, STARLA PETER-
SON aka STARLA PARKS, BRYCE AVERILL, 
HARRY KEITH HUFFAKER, ELZA HUFFAKER, 
his wife, THOMAS GENE REID, MARY 
REID, his wife, WANDA HOPPER, PARKS 
& SONS SANITATION, INC., a Utah 
corporation, PARKS & SONS INTER-
MOUNTAIN INC., an Idaho corporation, 
and JOHN DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED VERIFIED 
COMPLAINT 
C i-inl Nn 8S7Q 
The plaintiffs Formen Corporation, Don Skipworth, and 
Fred Smith, by and through counsel Lowell V. Summerhays and 
Edward T. Wells of the firm of SUMMERHAYS, RUNYAN & McLELLAND, 
hereby complain of the defendants and allege as follows: 
